Foreign and politically connected large investors, like Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), improve firm value through the provision of SWF domestic market access and government-related contracts. In the short run, the market welcomes SWF investments in expectation of potential monitoring and internationalization benefits. In the long run, the target firms' degree of internationalization and Tobin's q increase substantially after SWF investments. The increase in q is directly related to the number of government-related contracts granted by SWF countries. The target companies contribute to SWF markets by increasing their competitiveness, providing certification to their domestic markets, and transferring technological know-how.
Institutional investors have been the focus of much research in the last decade, given their increasing portfolio size and the role that they play in the global financial markets as large shareholders. A new class of institutional investors, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), has recently received increasing media, political, and corporate attention. SWFs are different from other institutional investors (i.e., mutual, pension, and hedge funds), because they are not only large, but also foreign and politically connected. International Financial Services London (2009) describes SWFs as: independent, increasingly active, and having higher risk tolerance and longer investment horizons than other institutional investors. In addition, SWFs are likely to continue to have a large and important impact as institutional players in financial markets with their increasing assets under management, future potential for growth, and desire to diversify into more mature markets. Despite SWFs' importance and unique characteristics, we know very little about the effects such investors have as shareholders in financial markets. In this paper, we study the role of SWFs as an example of foreign and politically connected large shareholders, and their impact on firm value. In addition, we investigate the possible economic motivations behind SWF investments.
The role of SWFs as investors in developed markets is unclear, as they can provide benefits as well as impose costs on the companies they invest in. On the one hand, SWFs as foreign investors can be considered as providers of foreign direct investments (FDI). Theories of corporate multinationalism and internationalization suggest that FDI from SWF countries might increase the value of a firm through intangible assets like providing access to previously inaccessible markets, patents, or consumer goodwill (e.g., Görg and Strobl, 2001; Lipsey, 2002) . On the other hand, SWFs can use their investments to extract technological knowhow and close the gap with the developed countries, in terms of comparative advantage.
In addition, SWFs have political connections to the governments of the countries where they originate from, i.e. they represent a foreign government connection for the target firm.
Empirical evidence shows that firms politically connected to domestic politicians generate higher market returns than their peers, as they benefit from preferential treatment (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Faccio and Parsley, 2009; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009a,b; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009) . Firms with foreign government connections might also benefit from such treatment. However, foreign government-related shareholders can force the firm to take sub-optimal investment decisions that benefit the economy of the investing countries.
1 Finally, as large shareholders, SWFs might improve corporate governance and add value to firms through monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . However, they might also extract rents from firms and enjoy the private benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 2000) .
Using a sample of SWF large U.S. investments where SWFs intend to actively engage with management, we analyze not only whether but also why SWF investments outperform the market in both the short and long term from the perspective of internationalization, political connections, and corporate governance. We find that the market reacts positively to SWF investments in the short-run in the expectation of increased corporate monitoring and future increases in business internationalization. This finding provides evidence that independent foreign institutions like SWFs, which do not have an incentive to be loyal to the management (i.e., "pressure resistant"), have the potential to enhance firm value through both direct and indirect monitoring, consistent with the findings of Ferreira and Matos (2008) . This result also suggests that the possibility of future market access in the investors'
countries is important to market participants in evaluating SWF investments. However, it is the government affiliation of the investors that plays an important role in increasing firm value in the long run. The SWF target firms generally outperform hedge fund target firms and catch up with matched firms in terms of Tobin's q two years after the investment. The increase in q is directly related to the provision of government-related contracts. This result 1 Policy makers are especially interested in this point. Two recent examples are: an interview of UK political figures in the program Money Programme by BBC One "Who is buying up Britain?" where it is claimed that the investment by Abu Dhabi Investment Authority in Barclays Bank might lead to more investments of the company in Abu Dhabi, e.g. establishment of call centers in Abu Dhabi. Second, during the special theme discussion at the World Economic Forum 2008 in Davos, Larry Summers argued very strongly that foreign government-related shareholders might use their political leverage to extract political and non-political benefits from target firms.
constitutes first hand evidence on the effects of foreign political connections on firm value and on one of the mechanisms via which political connections can affect firm value. Shareholder benefits ensuing from foreign political connections appear to outweigh the costs of private benefit extraction from SWF investors. However, we find a decrease in the technological and competitive gap between the U.S. and the SWF countries that provide the governmentrelated contracts. Overall, SWFs provide clear benefits for shareholders, but their impact on the economy of the recipient country, the U.S., remains unclear.
We use Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Schedule 13 filings of ownership that are larger than 5% to identify SWF targets from 1997 to 2008. Using these SWF block investments ensures that they have high enough stakes in a company to have incentives to engage with the management. In the short-run, SWF investments are perceived positively by the market, generating an average abnormal return of 12.5% during the event window.
The average short-term reaction is comparable to that of hedge fund investments (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009 ) and much higher than that of other institutional investors. We find that the cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns is related to the market expectation for increased monitoring and for benefits from increased internationalization.
Our findings support the literature on effective monitoring by institutional investors that are not bound by reporting regulations, like hedge funds and private equity firms, in comparison to other heavily regulated institutional investors such, as mutual and pension funds (i.e., Romano, 2001; Gillan and Starks, 2007; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009, among others) . As one of the world largest institutional investors and with high stakes in companies, SWFs often have specialized teams to assert their rights and interests (International Financial Services London, 2009 ). Furthermore, in our sample, they often hold long-term concentrated positions, which promotes and extends their effectiveness as informed monitors, consistent with Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) .
As foreign investors, SWFs can provide investment avenues and expertise in markets where target firms do not have experience, and thus generate value via foreign market penetration. Our results on internationalization support Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2008) , who provide evidence that newly internationalized firms experience an increase in market value in the year before and the year of internationalization.
The positive abnormal returns are not transient and continue throughout the holding period, where an average buy-and-hold abnormal return of 16% per annum is generated for the shareholders. The levels of Tobin's q and degree of internationalization (DOI) increase substantially in the post-SWF investment period. In the long run, we find a statistically significant 50% ex-post increase in the DOI of SWF target firms and a 31% increase in their Tobin's q. Through a detailed analysis of strings of corporate events involving the target firms, we find that these firms experience an increase in foreign sales and governmentrelated contracts after SWF investments. The target firms' q's increase significantly with the provision of government-related contracts. Furthermore, using an event study, we find that the stock price of firms that are given SWF government-related contracts increases on average by 3% above the market portfolio upon the announcement of the contract.
From existing literature, we conjecture four possible reasons why SWFs provide contracts to their foreign targets: to extract know-how (e.g., Keller, 2004) , to increase competition and efficiency in the local market (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt, 2005) , to obtain certification for the domestic market (Chung and Alcacer, 2002) , and to exploit insider information. We find evidence of technological transfer and increased competitiveness for China and Singapore. There is supporting evidence for a certification effect in the case of United Arab Emirates (UAE). We cannot reject the conjecture that SWFs do not exploit insider information.
Our results provide first hand evidence on how government-related shareholders can affect firm value. While the literature has only focused on whether political connections affect market value in the short-run (e.g. Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Faccio and Parsley, 2009; Goldman et al., 2009a) , we find that government-related contracts are one of the mecha-nisms via which government connectedness can result in firm value increases in the long run.
Furthermore, we are the first paper to provide evidence that not only domestic but also foreign government-related entities can create long-term value for the firm and the shareholders. Finally, we investigate and provide evidence on the underlying motives for foreign government involvement and procurement provision from economic theories.
The findings also add to the literature on multinationalism that shows positive spillover effects from the investments of companies from developed to less developed countries (e.g., Senbet, 1981, 1984; Fatemi, 1984; Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Morck and Yeung, 1991, 2001) . Investments from less developed countries, like the SWF ones, also increase firm value through positive spillovers of knowledge, productivity gains between firms, and encouraging foreign corporate expansions.
Recent work finds that, generally, SWFs invest minority stakes in small, non-listed, mainly domestic companies (Balding, 2008; Bortolotti, Fotak, Megginson, and Miracky, 2009; Bernstein, Lerner, and Schoar, 2009) , and they diversify across asset classes and geographic regions, but without taking excessive risk (Balding, 2008) . Also, SWFs are more likely to invest at home when local politicians are involved than when foreign managers are in control (Bernstein et al., 2009) . Several studies conclude that SWFs behave more like mutual funds (Beck and Fidora, 2008; Caner and Grennes, 2008) or hedge funds (Balding, 2008; Kotter and Lel, 2008) . In the short run, the market reacts positively to SWF investments (e.g. Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta, 2010) and negatively to SWF divestments (Kotter and Lel, 2008; Dewenter et al., 2010) .
2 The results in the long-run are mixed. Bortolotti et al.
(2009) find a negative two year matched firm adjusted return, and firms where SWFs have higher stakes yield significantly more negative returns, while returns increase with better 2 In related a study of government-controlled acquirers and mergers and acquisitions (M&A), Karolyi and Liao (2009) find that the share-price reactions to the announcements of such acquisitions are not different from other M&A announcements. However, they find important differences between SWFs and other government-controlled acquirers. SWF-led acquisitions are less likely to fail, they are more likely to pursue targets that are larger in total assets and with fewer financial constraints. Furthermore, they find that the market reactions to SWF-led acquisitions, while positive, are statistically and economically much smaller than those of other government-controlled acquirers.
SWF governance. However, Fernandes (2009) finds that firms that have higher SWF ownership have higher valuations (15-20%) and better operating performance. Dewenter et al. (2010) investigate the effect of SWF investment on firm value using data for small and large SWF investments in home and foreign countries, mainly in Asia. They find that often SWFs are active investors and their domestic target firms are subject to favorable government decisions, consistent with previous literature (e.g. Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Faccio and Parsley, 2009; Goldman et al., 2009a) .
Differently from these papers, we focus on the impact of internationalization and foreign government connections on firm value in developed markets, using SWFs as an example of investors with these characteristics. In addition, we analyze the reasons why foreign governments provide contracts to non-domestic target companies. We study a sample of U.S. listed firms where SWFs are large investors (hold more than 5% of a firm's outstanding shares) and actively engage with management. Using this data, allows us to clearly address the impact of internationalization, foreign political connections, and monitoring on firm value.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the data. Section II describes the characteristics of the SWF investments. Section III discusses the short-term and longterm results and their implications. Section IV provides an analysis of the reasons why SWF countries provide contracts to the target firms. Section V concludes the paper.
I. Data Description
Throughout this study, we use the term SWFs to refer to both sovereign wealth funds and sovereign-owned enterprises, as they are controlled by the government. International Financial Services London (2009) classifies sovereign investment vehicles in two broad categories: sovereign wealth funds and other sovereign investment vehicles. Sovereign wealth funds can be divided into two groups: stabilization funds and savings funds. Savings funds have man-3 A further advantage of our dataset is that we know the exact event date and the number of shares acquired, instead of relying on the media reports of the event.
dates to invest in internationally diversified portfolios, while stabilization funds provide support for the budget deficit. The other investment vehicles comprise: pension reserve funds, investment funds (normally counted as reserves), development funds (targeted towards domestic socioeconomic projects), and sovereign-owned enterprises. The latter are companies over which the state has significant control, where the minister of finance or managers from the savings fund generally sit on the board of directors. These enterprises often undertake foreign investments, and in several cases they do so in conjunction with savings funds. Thus, we consider sovereign-owned enterprises as just another vehicle of government investment and group them together with government savings funds under the term sovereign wealth funds.
There is no central data provider that collects information on SWF investments, instead there are several, partial, privately held databases that try to track SWF investments, but none of them is complete. Thus, we construct an independent sample of SWFs as large shareholders in U.S. publicly listed companies. We follow a similar procedure to identify a comparison group of hedge fund investments.
We search for any 13D filings that include the phrase "hedge fund" in Item 2 "Identity We collect data on foreign sales and foreign assets of the SWF target companies (13G and 13D) from the annual reports and the SEC 10K filings, to investigate DOI. We use this information to calculate the ratio of the foreign sales to total sales and foreign assets to total assets. The DOI is then measured as the average of the two, Sullivan (1994).
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No database collects information about granted government-related contracts outside the 5 Ideally, we would also need to calculate the ratio of overseas subsidiaries as a percentage of total subsidiaries and top managers' international experience, but this information is not available to us. U.S., to the best of our knowledge. Thus, we search Factiva for news articles of contracts signed by the target company in the country where the SWF investment originates from. For each firm in our sample, we use five key words for the search: deal, lease, contract, permit, and patent. We study all the contracts and deals before and after the SWF investment date to extract the news articles that are related to government sanctioned contracts. We find 88 such deals all pertaining to 13D investments, 27 before and 61 after the SWF investment.
We conduct a similar search for the matched firms of SWF targets. this category request and achieve the inclusion of a representative on the board of directors.
All the events in which the investor aims to affect and change the payout policy and/or the capital structure of the target company are grouped in the last category, capital structure, which is also the smallest. The objectives, apart from maximizing shareholder value, are not mutually exclusive because an investor can adopt a combination of tactics to achieve the aim of improving the value of the target company. The 13D and 13G investments also differ in terms of investment shares and sizes, presented in Table A1 Panel C. The 13D investments reach up to a 70.6% holding of the target company and the average investment size is twice as large as that of 13G investments. The average holding is about 22% for 13D investments and 8% for 13G investments.
7
Panels D and E in Table A1 show the country of origin of the investors and the investment year. 13D investments are evenly distributed among the different countries in the sample and they occur more often after 2002, as the size of SWFs has grown. Thus, our analysis is not biased towards the investment decisions and the policy of one individual country over a certain time period.
B. What Attracts SWF Investments?
Because SWFs file for both active and passive investments, we are interested in understanding what types of companies they become actively involved in. The first two columns of Table   I provide an overview of the characteristics of SWF target firms in the year before they are targeted. We compare 13D targets with three groups of peers: matched group, 13G
investments, and hedge fund 13D targets. Comparing 13D and 13G target characteristics sheds light on the circumstances in which SWFs choose to actively engage with management versus being passive shareholders. The comparison with hedge funds helps to assess whether SWFs have the same objectives and target the same firms as other active investors.
Initially, we compare the 13D target firms with a group of industry/size/book-to-market matched companies, taken from the universe of companies reported in Compustat. The matched firms are from the same year, share the same two-digit SIC code, and pertain to the same size/book-to-market 5×5 sorted portfolio. For the comparison of market capitalization, the matched firms are sorted based only on industry and book-to-market, while the bookto-market criterion is dropped for the Tobin q and book-to-market sorting.
The difference between a 13D target firm i and the matched firms is calculated as follows:
where X is the characteristic variable and firms j = 1, . . . , m are from the matched group.
We calculate the difference with 13G and hedge fund investments as the difference of the average value for each characteristic, because it is difficult to match them on a firm by firm basis. The 13D investment targets are deemed to display different characteristics from peer groups if the t-statistic is associated with a p-value lower than 10%.
Column (3) of Table I shows the average difference between 13D target firms and the matched group, and column (4) presents the t-statistic associated with the difference in characteristics. SWF targets are similar to matched firms in terms of capital structure and profitability, and they do not appear to be poorly governed. They only differ in terms of firm valuation, in comparison to matched firms. 13D targets have 46% lower Tobin's q (defined as (book value of total assets+market value of equity-book value of equity)/book value of total assets) and an 11% higher book-to-market (BM ) than their matched group.
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The comparison with 13G targets yields similar results to the matched group, in terms of firm size and capital structure. 13D targets exhibit higher returns for the assets used in production (ROA, the ratio of EBITDA to lagged assets). Furthermore, 13D targets have higher payout ratios (P AY OU T , the ratio between total dividend payments and net income before extraordinary items) than 13G targets.
The most striking difference in characteristics is between 13D and hedge fund targets, as shown in columns (7) and (8). The market value of 13D firms is much higher than that of hedge funds. SWF investments are ten times larger than the ones reported for activist hedge funds (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009 ). This is not surprising as the total amount of investment resources available to each SWF is much larger than that available to each hedge fund individually. Thus, SWFs might be in a unique position to affect companies where hedge funds do not have enough capital to invest. In terms of firm valuation, 13D
targets have significantly higher Tobin's q but lower book-to-market than hedge fund targets.
SWF investments appear to be financially more sound than hedge fund investments, if one considers ROA and cash flows (CF ). In terms of capital structure, 13D investments have lower dividend yields (DIV Y LD) than hedge fund targets. These statistics clearly reject any hypothesis that SWFs behave similarly to hedge funds in their choice of targets.
In summary, SWFs appear to invest in technology and manufacturing companies whose value can be improved, but they do not target the worst companies or the ones in need of most change like hedge funds.
III. The Effect of SWF Investments on Firm Value

A. Univariate Analysis
We first analyze some statistics for the main variables of interest before and after the SWF investment summarized in Table II for SWF targets and their matched firms. 9 Industry
Tobin's q (Industry q) is the average Tobin's q of firms that share the same first two digits of the SIC codes with SWF targets, and relative Tobin's q (Relative q) is the difference between firm Tobin's q and industry Tobin's q. The pre-investment period covers three years before the investment, while the post-investment period lasts until divestment. The average Tobin's 9 The matched firm government-related deals and foreign country presence is calculated as follows. Instead of using the average presence for the group of matched firms, we set match firm government-related deals and presence equal to one if at least one of the matched firms receives a government-related deal or is present in the SWF country. We do this in order to mitigate the effects coming from the large number of matched firms that we use. Using the average for the matched firms as in equation (1), we find a substantially lower percentage of firms that receive government-related deals and have lower presence in the SWF countries.
q of the target firms significantly increases in the post-investment period by 31%, from 1.60 to 2.14. The average q of the SWF target companies is lower than the Industry q before and 18% larger than the Industry q after the SWF investment. The change relative to the industry is statistically significant. DOI also increases by 50% in the post-SWF-investment period.
In the period before the SWF investment, only 15% of the firms in our sample receives government-related deals (Govt. Cont. % ) from the investor's country, while this share increases significantly to 36% in the period after SWF investments. In contrast, 19% of matched firms receive a contract in the SWF country before the SWF investment in the target firm and the same after. The gap in government-related deals between the SWF target firms and the matched group widens substantially after the SWF investment in the target firm, as SWF targets receive substantially more government-related deals. It is also worth noting that 13G target firms do not receive such contracts. The average number of deals given per SWF target (Govt. Cont. Number ) doubles in the post SWF investment period, and the increase is significantly different from zero. China provides contracts to 31% of the SWF target companies that receive at least one, United Arab Emirates to 27%, Saudi Arabia to 18%, and Singapore to 18%.
For robustness, we record the number of target companies and matched firms that have sales in the SWF investor country prior to the investment, as reported in the Segments database in Compustat. Unfortunately, the data reported in Segments is very often aggregated at the continent level, making it very difficult to distinguish in which specific country companies are present. Furthermore, our Factiva and company annual report search indicates that some companies already had a presence in the SWF investor country, which the Segments database does not report. Thus, we merge the information from the Factiva search to that from the Segments database in Total Presence. From merging the two datasets, we find that 34% of our SWF target sample and 39% of the matched firms already had a presence in the investor's country prior to the SWF investment, an indication that SWFs target companies are behind their peers in accessing these particular markets. The presence of target firms increases significantly, by 24%, while that of matched firms by 6% after SWF investments occur.
10 The presence of matched firms is substantially lower than that of SWF target firms in the post SWF investment period. Only in 5% of the cases, SWF target companies that have a prior presence in the country receive government-related deals. These preliminary results indicate that SWF targets experience significant increases in q, DOI, and government-related deals after the investment. It is unlikely that SWFs have access to a category of managers that is superior to that of hedge funds or asset management firms in choosing target firms, but they seem to generate value by providing access to a pool of investment opportunities previously unavailable to the target firm.
B. Market Reaction Around the 13D Filing
We investigate the short-run performance of SWF investments by constructing the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) starting from 20 trading days before the 13D filing and ending 20 days after the filing. CARs are calculated above the expected market returns estimated for the period (-255,-20) measured using the value-weighted NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ index 10 Given our choice of asymmetric pre-and post-investment period, one might argue that the difference in the statistics occurs because of the longer post-investment period. We do not believe this is the case for two reasons. First, the pre-investment period is longer than the post-investment period for firms that receive an SWF investment after 2006. Second, we calculate the differences in the reported variables for equal pre-and post-investment windows (i.e. take a pre-investment period that is as long as the post-investment), and the results remain qualitatively unchanged. However, some firms drop out of the analysis because there is no information for years further out in the pre-investment period, especially for foreign presence and sales.
from CRSP.
11 Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average CAR through the event window.
Positive abnormal returns start to accumulate about ten days before the filing. The run-up can be explained by the fact that transactions occur sometime between ten and one day before the 13D filing. The filing is important in revealing whether the SWF has any intention to actively engage with the company. The average CAR reaches 11.5% just before the 13D filing date and an upward trend continues for the 20 days after the filing. The total average abnormal return for the event window is 12.5%, which is statistically different from zero. There is a 2% increase in CAR on the day of the filing, which might be related to the active engagement intentions. investments generate much larger abnormal returns, which remain high throughout the event window. The magnitude of the average CAR for 13D firms is similar to the one reported in Figure 1 , although we only include the smaller 13D investments. The market expects higher future cash flows from 13D targets than 13G ones, as a result of the SWF investment.
The CAR for 13G investments is 4.7% and not statistically different from zero, while that of 13D investments is 10.6% and statistically different from zero. Second, there is a run-up for both types of investments two days before the investment, when the 5% threshold is crossed. This is not surprising for 13G deals, since some of the recent 13G transactions have been widely discussed in the media as they involved non-voting stakes in high profile companies,
i.e., Temasek's investment in Merrill Lynch. The run-up for 13D events is more difficult to explain, as we cannot find any discussion of the deals prior to the investment date via a Factiva search. However, one possibility is that the SWFs are being front-run, as they build up their position in the target companies and do not acquire all the shares in one transaction.
B.1. Explaining the Cross-Sectional Differences in Market Reaction
SWFs are large investors that originate in a foreign country where they are politically connected. Large investors have the potential to generate positive returns for the firm by increasing monitoring of the management, as well as to extract personal benefits. Politicians and media heavily scrutinize SWFs as investors, therefore SWFs try to minimize the publicity related to the extraction of personal benefits from target companies and focus on interacting with management to create value. As foreign investors, SWFs can provide investment opportunities and expertise in markets where the target firm does not have experience, and thus generate value via foreign market access. As politically connected, SWFs can create value by giving government-related contracts to target firms. We try to separate the effect of each of these characteristics on market reaction and test three hypotheses:
i. There is a positive relation between abnormal returns and the benefits of monitoring.
ii. There is a positive relation between abnormal returns and the expectation of future internationalization.
iii. There is a positive relation between abnormal returns and the expectation of future government-related deals.
To investigate the first hypothesis, we follow Brav et al. (2008) and use dummy variables derived from 13D filings, as presented in There is a strong empirical link between secondary market liquidity and shareholder dispersion. Liquidity measures worsen with more blockholders (Mukherji, Kim, and Walker, 1997) and the probability of trading against an informed shareholder increases (Heflin and Shaw, 2000) . We control for liquidity using the difference in Amihud illiquidity measures three months before the announcement (-100,-40) and during the announcement (-20,+20), Illiquidity Ann. In our estimation, we also control for: the size effect measured using the log of market capitalization, ln(M ktCap), on the day before the first date of the event window (-20) ; the average abnormal return for the window (-20,+20) obtained from the same investor in previous 13D investments as an indication of previous success, Avg. Pre-return; firm distress due to debt problems using Long Term Debt, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has outstanding long term debt in the investment year, and zero otherwise; the initial investment share in the target firm, Initial Investment; and Diversification, the number of markets a firm is present in taken from the Segments database in Compustat. All the non-dummy variables are deviations from the sample mean, thus, they can be interpreted as partial effects of the explanatory variable on the CAR. No intercept is included in the 12 ∆DOI and Govt. Cont. are ex post measures. It is not common to use forward looking variables to explain current returns, but, in the case of internationalization, Gozzi et al. (2008) show that the benefits are immediately reflected in prices, i.e., the share price reacts upon announcement. Thus, it seems justifiable to use such a measure, especially given the observation that the DOI impact might not be identifiable after the event window (Gozzi et al., 2008) . Using ex post data to infer ex ante values, we implicitly assume that investors are rational and their ex-ante rational expectations are efficient.
regression since the investment intention dummies span the array of the constant (Suits, 1957) .
In Table III , we present the results of an OLS regression (correcting for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity). We find that all monitoring dummies have positive coefficients that lead to 7 to 20% higher abnormal returns, but not all of them are statistically significant.
Intentions to change the business strategy and capital structure are statistically significant and have the highest impact. This is an indication that the market expects SWFs to engage with management, mostly by influencing the business strategy. In addition, ∆DOI has a large impact on returns, implying an increase of 1.22% in the returns for a 1% change in DOI. The market prices potential future benefits that derive from expansion in new markets that are related to the investor. This is consistent with the findings of Gozzi et al. (2008) that share prices reflect the potential benefits of internationalization quickly. Government contracts, on the other hand, do not appear to have a statistically significant impact. This result might be due to the difficulty in understanding the link between SWF investors and the potential to obtain government-related contracts.
From the control variables, it is worth noting that a decrease in liquidity of the asset by 1% leads to higher CAR of 0.12%. Also, the market expects 0.98% higher CAR whenever the previous investments abnormal returns increase by 1%. As expected, the more diversified firms exhibit lower abnormal returns, but the effect is statistically insignificant. The size of the initial investment and firm size do not affect short-term returns. Long-term debt also does not have a significant impact on CAR, implying that the market does not expect debtholder expropriation from SWFs.
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13 Other variables that were used to explain the abnormal returns but are not significant are: the Truman transparency index, SWF Institute governance and transparency index, average of previous years' GDP growth, World Bank ease of doing business variables, blockholders, industry and country dummies, and short-term debt variables. We also used the current and previous year leverage as an explanatory variable instead of the long-term debt dummy, and the results do not change quantitatively.
B.2. Temporary Price Impact
An alternative explanation for the high abnormal return observed around and after the 13D filing is that the market overreacts to the news or that the price increase is only due to price pressure from excessive demand, and the change in price is temporary. Then, we would expect a temporary increase in prices around the 13D filing and a subsequent downward correction. The abnormally high trading volume around the announcement time, averaging 143% above normal as shown in Figure 1 , reinforces the overreaction explanation. However, the average CAR in Figure 1 remains stable in the month after the 13D filing and does not revert towards zero. This is an initial indication that the overreaction explanation may not be valid.
We investigate the temporary price impact alternative more formally using event-time portfolios for the years before and after the 13D filing. We track all SWF target and matched stocks for periods of three months, for the year before and after the SWF investments. Every three months, we form a daily portfolio of all SWF target firms and of the matched firms, separately. The event period portfolio is held only for two months, the same as the event window used in the previous analysis. We estimate the portfolio excess return "Alpha" over the Fama-French factors: market excess return, small-minus-big (SMB), and high-minus-low (HML), and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (MOM). Daily data are obtained from the
Fama-French directory in Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The ex-ante portfolios
could not have been constructed at the time of the investment, but they are informative of the development of the investment. Table IV shows the regression results using the equally and value-weighted CRSP indexes as the benchmark market return.
14 If the observed abnormal return is temporary, then we should observe a positive "Alpha" on the event period and negative "Alpha" after the event for the SWF targets portfolio. The results show that the only significant "Alpha" coefficient for SWF target firms is the one of the event period, i.e. (-20,+20) days around the 13D filing and it is positive. There is no other statistically significant "Alpha" for any of the periods in the quarters after the SWF investment in the target firms. Therefore no reversion has occurred, and the observed event window CAR is unlikely to be due to market overreaction or temporary price pressure.
In addition, there is no significant "Alpha" for the SWF targets in the year before the SWF investment. This finding can be considered as evidence against market timing. However, there are statistically significant "Alphas" for the matched firms in the year before the SWF investment for equally weighted portfolios. This effect disappears when value weighted portfolios are used. The fit of the four factor model is much better for matched firms than for the SWF targets.
C. The Long-Run Impact of SWF Investments
The short-run positive abnormal returns reflect the market expectation of firm future profits.
This expectation might not materialize in the future, which makes the study of the long-term performance of the target companies necessary. To understand whether SWF investments generate long-term value for the company, we calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for all the investments. We use the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark, starting from 20 days prior to the SWF investment until the investment drops below the 5% threshold, as reported in a Schedule 13D/A statement. 15 In cases where there is no exit report, we assume that the investment continues until the end of the investigated period, December 31, 2008. SWFs divest from a company only in 19% of our sample. The average BHAR is 16% per year. 16 However, BHAR is sensitive to risk adjustment and may result in overstating the abnormal performance (see Franks et al., 1991; Lang and Stulz, 1994 , and references therein). Thus, we focus on firm accounting variables to better understand the implications of SWF investments for target firms, instead of analyzing the determinant of 15 It is not possible to track investments less than 5% as SWFs are not financial institutions and do not have to file 13F forms. 16 We also calculated the cumulative market-adjusted return and the results are qualitatively similar.
BHAR.
C.1. Firm Performance
We investigate changes in firm value, profitability, and efficiency, in the two years prior and subsequent to the investment, for an initial analysis of changes in firm fundamentals. We show these changes in comparison to the matched group, 13G, and hedge fund investments.
We use Tobin's q as a measure of firm value, and EBITDA/assets and EBITDA/sales as efficiency and profitability measures, respectively. All the data are taken from Compustat. Table V The difference with 13G targets is stronger than that with the matched group, as presented in Table V Panel B. The 13D target firms start with no difference in efficiency and profitability and 39% lower Tobin's q than the 13G investments. In the two years subsequent to the SWF investment, 13D firms show 15% higher EBITDA/assets and 37% higher EBITDA/sales than the 13G firms. This is a significant increase in efficiency of 13% and in profitability of 29% for 13D targets in comparison to 13G targets, in a span of three years.
Furthermore, q increases from 39% significantly worse than 13G targets to 10% higher than that of 13G targets, a statistically significant increase of 49%. These results suggest that SWF investors engage with 13D targets in a different way compared to 13G targets. One important difference is that none of the 13G targets in our sample receives government-related contracts before or after the SWF investment.
Comparing the long-term performance of 13D investments and hedge fund investments sheds light on some important differences between the two groups of investors, as presented in Gompers et al., 2003) . In the regression, we control for changes in the dividend and leverage policy, total assets, one-year sales growth, the market beta over the five years before the investment, and diversification, the number of geographical segments a company is present in. The group of the control variables employed encompasses those used by Chen et al. (2007) , Gozzi et al. (2008) , and Ferreira and Matos (2008) . We also include year and firm fixed effects in our regression. Columns (2) and (4) include the effects of DOI and of government-related deals (Govt.
Cont.). Govt. Cont. is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for each year where a company receives at least a government-related contract, otherwise it is zero. We consider this to be a lower bound estimate of the number of contracts received per year, as the Factiva search might not cover all the received contracts. DOI has a statistically insignificant impact on Tobin's q. This result is congruent with Gozzi et al. (2008) who find that change in internationalization does not affect Tobin's q after the investment year. We find that the post-investment increase in Tobin's q is significantly related to the provision of governmentrelated deals from the SWF acquiring countries. The Tobin's q for a firm that receives government-related deals in a given year is a 0.73 higher than for a firm that does not receive a contract, and the impact is highly economically significant. This is not surprising as 36% of the sample receive some form of government-related deals in the post-investment period. The adjusted R 2 for the Tobin's q regression increases by 2% and that of the Relative q increases by 5%. The control variables have the same sign across the different specifications and the results are consistent to using Tobin's q or Relative q. We find no country specific or industry effects.
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The above analysis indicates that one conduit for the value creation (increase in Tobin's q) of SWFs as investors is the provision of government-related contracts. To further elaborate on the effect of government-related contracts, we perform an event study around the time of the reporting of the contract in Factiva. We analyze CARs with respect to the market model for all the contracts that we recorded in the Factiva search, divided in two groups:
pre-SWF investment and post-SWF investment. The event date is the date in which the first article on the contract appears in Factiva. We estimate the market model for the period (-255,-10) using the value-weighted NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ index from CRSP. We then calculate the abnormal returns for different time periods over the expected market returns.
We find that the stock price increases substantially on the day of the announcement of such contracts, but the effects around the announcement date are different between pre-and post-SWF investment contracts. The results in Panel A of Table VII show that there is only a temporary increase in stock price of 1.52% on the day of the announcement for contracts issued before the SWF investment. The CARs for any other period are not significantly different from zero. The impact of government-related contracts is much higher for deals reported after the SWF investment. Panel B in Table VII shows that the announcement day impact is 2.48%, double that of pre-SWF investment contracts, and the (+1,-1) day return is 3.10% above the expected return. These returns remain high and significant for two weeks after the announcement. Thus, the government-related contracts contribute substantially to a non-temporary increase in the firm's market value.
SWF investments benefits appear to outweigh the costs for firm value and shareholders, as SWF target firms exhibit large BHAR and increases in Tobin's q. Our results suggest that one of the mechanisms by which politically connected investors contribute to firm value are the provisions of contracts and permits. Furthermore, results from the Tobin's q analysis in Table VI , the abnormal increase in share price due to the provision of government-related contracts in Table VII , and the univariate analysis of market access post-SWF investment in Table II show that foreign politically connected investors can also generate value, as they provide access to previously inaccessible markets.
IV. Why Do SWFs Provide Contracts to Foreign Companies?
There are several reasons why SWF governments provide local market access to foreign firms.
In the following, we investigate four conjectures: to extract knowledge and technology, to increase competition and efficiency of the local market, to obtain certification for the domestic market, and to exploit insider information or rent seeking.
The literature on multinationalism and internationalization establishes that substantial technological transfer occurs when firms invest in foreign markets (e.g., Keller, 2004; Baranson, 1970) . Chung and Alcacer (2002) and Wesson (2004) argue that foreign investments and M&A are the most effective channels for firms to access and source strategic assets. 18 SWF investments into U.S. listed firms can be seen as the acquisition of strategic assets, which include reputation, buyer-supplier relationships, tacit knowledge, R&D capability, brand name, knowledge, and proprietary technologies (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Barney, 1991) .
Transfer of technological know-how should result in an increase in inputs (R&D), outputs (patents), and total factor productivity (TFP, the difference between total output, GDP, and total inputs used, labor and capital) (Keller, 2004 Amit and Schoemaker (1993) define strategic assets as "the set of difficult to trade and imitate, scarce, appropriable and specialized resources and capabilities that bestow the firm's competitive advantage". the number of patents granted to residents divided by R&D personnel in business, has also been increasing for both China and Singapore.
Insert Table VIII here Panel B in Table VIII shows that China has moved from a net importer (-10,040 million USD in 1997) of high-tech goods to a net exporter (31,400 million USD in 2006). The change is mostly due to the increase in exports of computers and telecommunications (from -2,000 to 154,200 million USD), which is also the area where they have been giving the government-related contracts. For robustness, we also consider an alternative measure of high-tech exports provided by the IMD World Competitiveness Center that is also available for Singapore. Table A2 in the Appendix shows that total exports of high-tech products for China and Singapore have increased substantially in the period 1998 to 2007. The growth in Chinese and Singaporean high-tech exports is much higher than the U.S. growth, and in 2007 China exported more high-tech goods than the U.S.. Thus, we find some supporting evidence on the transfer of technological know-how.
Given the enormous national reserves, SWFs might allow access to foreign players to improve the productivity and efficiency of their domestic markets. Bertschek (1995) argues that foreign competition can lead to an increase in innovation as it exposes domestic companies to international competitive forces. Such exposure can increase pressure for product quality improvement, price reduction, and the generation of new ideas that can stimulate domestic firms to innovate. Aghion et al. (2005) suggests that competition from foreign multinationals can stimulate domestic innovation activities and drive domestic companies' efficiency. Zhou, Li, and Tse (2002) hypothesizes that local firms that directly compete with foreign firms have to increase their productivity and less efficient local firms are driven out of the market. Thus, the presence of foreign firms in the domestic market should increase its productivity.
To investigate this conjecture, we use the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI, Growth
Competitiveness Index before 2004) compiled by the World Economic Forum. GCI is con-structed as a weighted average of many components capturing different determinants of competitiveness.
19 Panel C in Table VIII reports the rankings of all the countries that provide government-related contracts, the percentile each country is ranked in, and the total score. China, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia have improved significantly in overall ranking, score, and relative ranking (percentile) since 2001, while the UAE has remained stable. For robustness, we also investigate changes in different competitiveness measures for China and Singapore (data for UAE and Saudi Arabia are not available) as compiled by the IMD World
Competitiveness Center. Table A3 a quantitative survey of international business and leisure travelers; expert opinions from development, tourism and hospitality professionals; and statistics that link brand equity to asset, growth, and expansion. UAE and Saudi Arabia are the two countries where we observe contracts mainly related to hospitality and entertainment. This is in line with the recent efforts of the UAE to become a hub for shopping and hospitality. Panel D in Table   VIII shows the ranking of the UAE in the CBI for different categories (Saudi Arabia is not ranked). The UAE has moved from tenth rank to first in the resort lodging category and is second in the shopping category. Also the UAE has been systematically second or third in the rising country brand category. We consider this as supporting evidence for the certification conjecture.
One additional reason for providing contracts to companies, where SWFs are large shareholders, is insider information and rent seeking. SWFs may have insider information on procurement contracts the government will provide and the likelihood a certain firm will obtain them. In addition, the government has an incentive to allocate contracts or provide permits to companies where they hold shares (via SWFs), as they can claw back part of the investment value through stock price increases and dividends. The conjecture implies that all SWF target firms, active or passive, should receive government-related contracts within a reasonable amount of time and that SWFs ought to hold stakes in all the companies that receive such contracts. However, we find that only 36% of the 13D and none of the 13G target firms receive such contracts (see Table VII ). Matched firms also receive governmentrelated contracts despite not being the SWFs portfolio. Thus, we find little evidence for the insider information and rent seeking conjecture.
Overall, we find supporting evidence for the transfer of technological know-how for China and Singapore. China, Singapore and Saudi Arabia can also be related to the market improvement conjecture. The UAE appears to be looking for certification.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the role of a new class of institutional investors, namely Sovereign Wealth Funds, in financial markets. SWFs are different from any other investor analyzed so far, as they are not only large, but also foreign and politically connected. We find that SWFs invest in growth firms with low exposure to their countries, where they can provide diversification opportunities. The market reacts positively to SWF investments in the short-run, in the expectation of increased monitoring and future increases in internationalization. In the long-run, SWF target firms outperform hedge fund investments and catch up with the matched firms in terms of Tobin's q. We find that the increase in q is due to the provision of government-related contracts. Our results point to the benefits of large and foreign investors for shareholders. In addition, we provide evidence that government-related contracts are one of the mechanisms by which government connections can affect firm value in the long run. Finally, we find that the reasons for the provision of contracts to SWF targets differ among countries, but are mainly related to the transfer of technological know-how and certification of the local market. Figure 2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around 13D and 13G Investment Dates
This figure presents cumulative abnormal returns for the 13D and 13G investments, in excess of the market returns (value weighted CRSP index) for the period (-20,+20) for the event date, i.e. when the benchmark of 5% is actually breached, as reported in the filings. Only 13D firms that acquire similar proportion of shares outstanding in a company to 13G firms are included. Table I Firm Characteristics
This table presents the summary statistics of SWF target firms and comparisons with a set of matched firms, 13G, and hedge fund targets for the year before the SWF investment. The first two columns present the mean and the standard deviation (Std) of the target company characteristics. Columns (3) and (4) present the average difference with an industry/size/book-to-market matched group and the associated t-statistic. The industry match is from the Compustat universe of firms that share the same two-digit SIC code. Matching is based on industry and book-to-market for the M V comparison, and on industry and size for the BM and Tobin's q comparison. Columns (5) and (6) show the difference with 13G investments and the associated t-statistic. Columns (7) and (8) show the difference with hedge fund investments in the same period and the associated t-statistic. M V is the market capitalization in million U.S. dollars; BM is the book to market ratio defined as (book value of equity/market value of equity); Tobin's q is defined as (book value of total assets + market value of equity -book value of equity)/book value of total assets; ROA is the return on assets defined as EBITDA/lag(assets); CF is cash flow defined as (net income + depreciation and amortization)/lag (assets); LEV is the book leverage ratio defined as debt/(debt + book value of equity); CASH is defined as (cash + cash equivalents)/assets; DIV Y LD is the dividend yield defined as (common + preferred dividends)/(market value of common stocks + book value of preferred); and P AY OU T is the payout ratio, defined as total dividend payments divided by net income before extraordinary items. Pre refers to the average of the three years prior to the SWF investment. Post covers the period after the SWF investment, until divestment or the end of the sample period. Diff. is the difference between the pre and post period characteristics. DOI is the degree of internationalization calculated as the average of the foreign share of sales and assets. Tobin's q is defined as (book value of total assets+market value of equitybook value of equity)/book value of total assets as reported in Compustat. Industry q is the average Tobin's q of all the firms in Compustat that share the same two-digit SIC code with the target firm. Relative q is the difference between Tobin's q and Industry q. Govt. Cont. % is the percentage of SWF target firms that receive government-related deals as collected from the Factiva search. Govt. Cont. %, Matched Group is the percentage of matched firms that receive government deals as collected from the Factiva search. Diff. is the difference between the average number of SWF target firms and matched firms that receive government-related contracts. Govt. Cont. %, G13 Firms is the number of government-related contracts that 13G target firms receive. Govt. Cont. Number is the average number of deals for the SWF target firms that did obtain such contracts. Total Presence is the percentage of firms that have a presence in the investor's country as either reported in Segments Compustat or obtained from the Factiva search. Total Presence, Matched Group is the matched firms presence in the investor's country as either declared in Segments or obtained from the Factiva search. Diff. Presence (13D-Matched) is the difference between the average total presence of SWF target firms and matched firms in the investor country. New Blockholders represent the percentage of SWF target firms where there are new shareholders with shares of more than 5% that filed a 13D form one month or one year before and after the SWF investment.
* , * * , * * * represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Table I , Panel A; a measure of the change in the degree of internalization, ∆DOI, calculated as the difference between DOI (average of foreign sales and assets to total sales and assets) the year before the investment and the average DOI subsequent to the SWF investment; Govt. Cont. is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company is awarded any government-related contracts after the investment, or zero; ln(M ktCap) the log of market capitalization; Illiquidity, the difference in Amihud measures three months before the announcement (-100, -40) and during the event window (-20,+20) ; the average return obtained from the same investor in previous 13D filing related investments Avg. Pre-return; Initial Investment accounts for the size of the initial investment; LT Debt is a dummy variable for the existence of long-term debt in the firm in the investment year; and Diversification is a variable that contains the total number of geographical segments where the company is present. t-statistics (t-stat) are heteroscedasticity consistent. All non dummy variables are expressed as deviations from the sample mean. There is no intercept in the regression.
Pre
* , * * , * * * represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. This table presents abnormal returns from the investment in SWF targets and the matched firms before and after their investment. These are regression estimates and t-stats from equal-and value-weighted portfolio regressions. Window refers to the investment period in months. Alpha is the intercept of the factor model regression, and is calculated using the four-factor model with the value-and equally-weighted NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ CRSP portfolio as benchmark, the Fama-French size and book-to-market factors, and the Carhart momentum factor. Panels A and B present the results using the equally and value weighted CRSP portfolio portfolio, respectively. t-statistics (t-stat) are heteroscedasticity consistent. All variables are taken from the WRDS Fama-French Factors database.
* , * * , * * * represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
13D Firms
Matched Firms This table presents accounting measures of target company performance in the period of two years before and after SWF investments. Panel A presents the difference with an industry/size/book-to-market matched group and the t-statistic for the difference is based on unequal variance groups. Matching is based on industry and book-to-market for the M V comparison, and on industry and size for the BM and Tobin's q comparison. Panel B presents the difference with 13G investments and the t-statistics (t-stat) on the difference based on unequal variance groups. Panel C presents the difference with hedge fund investments in the same period and the t-statistic on the difference based on unequal variance groups.
* , * * , * * * represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. This table presents a panel regression of the Tobin's q level of the target companies starting from the SWF investment until their divestment or the end of the sample. Relative q is the industry adjusted Tobin's q. Growth is the one-year sales growth of the company. Beta is the average market beta over five years, where the market benchmark is the S&P500 index. Diversification includes the total number of geographical segments where the company is present as reported in the Segments database in Compustat. DOI is average of foreign sales and assets to total sales and assets. Gov. Cont. is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company is awarded any government-related contracts in a given year, and zero otherwise.
* , * * , * * * represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics using robust standard errors adjusted for time and firm dependence are presented in square brackets. This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of a government-related contract for the 13D target firms in the SWF country. The benchmark model is the value-weighted CRSP index. Raw represents the raw abnormal returns and Abnormal presents the returns above the market model. Event is the day the contract is reported in the media, as found from Factiva. Panels A and B show the results for the contracts awarded before and after the SWF invested in the firm, respectively. Continued on next page . . . The sample of U.S. listed companies includes 58 13D and 35 13G events. Panel A summarizes the objectives of SWF investors as stated in 13D filings, where the categories are defined as in Brav et al. (2008) . Categorization is not mutually exclusive. Panel B presents the industry focus of SWF investments reported under Schedule 13D and 13G. Panel C provides the distribution of the initial investment share in the target company and the size of these investments on the filing day. Panel D presents the distribution of the country of origin of the investor. Panel E presents the distribution of the investments across the sample period. Continued on next page . . . 
